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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

ADAPTATIONS IN NATO AND EUROPEAN NAVAL COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1989

by

Christopher H. Inskeep

March 2001

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

David S. Yost
Col. Tjarck Roessler

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**ADAPTATIONS IN NATO AND EUROPEAN NAVAL
COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1989**

Christopher H. Inskeep
Lieutenant, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes post-1989 organizational and capability adaptations of NATO and European naval command organizations. Specifically, this thesis examines how the adaptations of the Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and the Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), as well as the definition of the European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) concept, strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and endow the European Union (EU) with a naval dimension. These organizational adaptations are intended to help the member nations of NATO and the EU meet evolving international security challenges. However, they have also raised significant questions about whether NATO European allies are willing to fund NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to address military and naval deficiencies. The capabilities gap between the naval forces of the United States and those of NATO European allies poses noteworthy challenges, including interoperability.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1989, the evolving security environment has been a key concern for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The future security environment is difficult to forecast because of problems such as demographic imbalances, environmental and social change, and the tensions between prosperous and developing nations. The increasing interdependence and multiple interactions among nations mean that few nations or political groups can be completely isolated from evolving crisis situations. Future conflicts among nations are likely when they compete for economic advantage and access to limited resources.

NATO and the EU have to realize that flexible military forces must be available to meet evolving security challenges. The most adaptable forces capable of responding on short notice to these likely scenarios are maritime forces. For this reason, naval organizations such as the Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), the Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), as well as the concept of an European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF), are among the assets that must be earmarked to meet emerging security threats.

This thesis analyzes post-1989 organizational and capability adaptations of NATO and European naval command organizations. Specifically, this thesis examines how the adaptations of the Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and the Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), as well as the definition of the

European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) concept, strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and endow the European Union (EU) with a naval dimension. These organizational adaptations are intended to help the member nations of NATO and the EU meet evolving international security challenges. However, they have also raised significant questions about whether NATO European allies are willing to fund NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to address military and naval deficiencies. The capabilities gap between the naval forces of the United States and those of NATO European allies poses noteworthy challenges, including interoperability.

NATO remains relevant today because its members work together to bring their combined energy to bear in shaping the European security environment. These naval organizational and conceptual adaptations, including those made within the framework of ESDI, are intended to strengthen NATO and the EU and to enhance their ability to act within the immediate European area and beyond. These naval organizations and concepts must continue to develop mutually supportive and complementary capabilities while adapting to the changing international security environment in order to sustain the West's naval superiority.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. DESCRIPTION OF THESIS

This thesis analyzes the organizational and capability adaptations to the changing operational requirements of NATO and European naval command organizations since 1989. It identifies the naval command organizations of interest and examines their adaptations to the changing international security environment. The key questions include: What advantages do these organizational and capability adaptations offer the United States and the other NATO allies? What implications do these adaptations have for United States naval forces in Europe? What further adaptations in these organizations may be required?

B. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Since 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the primary defense structure for its members on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO's maritime component evolved during the Cold War to joint warfighting levels not previously matched. With the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international security environment, NATO allies had to adapt their military policies and postures.

In the early 1990s, the European Union (EU) expanded its involvement in the political-military realm with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. As the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union (WEU) noted, the Maastricht Treaty called for the WEU to "be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen

the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”¹ In the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, the WEU Council of Ministers indicated that “military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”²

The EU summit meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 specified targets that the EU countries should aim for in terms of military capabilities. The agreed on “headline goal” was to be established by 2003 and forces were to be:

able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000 – 60,000 persons)...forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. ³

Additionally, the “headline goal” called for development and coordination of monitoring and early warning systems, an increased number of readily deployable forces, enhanced strategic sea lift capabilities, establish a European air transport command, and new permanent political-military bodies within the European Council. The “headline

¹ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Maastricht, December 10, 1991. “Maastricht Declaration,” Introduction, par 2, “The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.”

² Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992, “Petersberg Declaration,” par.4 of Part II, “On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role,” quoted in David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington, DC: United States Information Press, 1998), p. 209.

³ European Union Presidency Conclusion, Helsinki 10 and 11 December 1999, Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm Annex IV.

goal” calls for many ground force improvements but references to naval improvement requirements have been minimal, to say the least.

These declarations, which reflect a continued desire on the part of the EU states to reduce their reliance on the United States and assume greater responsibility for regional defense and security, have not yet come fully to fruition. Since 1992 NATO European nations have cut their defense budgets by 22 percent in real terms.⁴ For these reasons, the strength of the ESDP proposals have been undermined; and it is unlikely to be substantially improved in the near future. With the political leaders of the EU calling for improved military forces but unlikely to obtain all the capabilities required to comply with their stated “headline goal” to be fulfilled by 2003, the United States and NATO are needed to fill the void. This is particularly true with regard to naval capabilities because the need for naval forces is increasing and the EU’s declared goals give little attention to naval capabilities.

Collective defense remains at the core of the NATO commitments of the United States and the other allies. However, their security activities now range across much wider areas of interests that involve multinational forces on a local or regional scale. With lower force levels, decreased funding, and continuing commitments regarding regional and “out of area” security, the United States and its Allies have to be ready to work together with lighter and smaller naval forces. Future naval forces will have to be more mobile, flexible, and diverse to meet emergent challenges that are different in scope than previously experienced. NATO forces led by the United States will need to have multi-

⁴ “The NATO Capability Gap,” in *Strategic Survey 1999/2000* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000). pp 19-20.

purpose characteristics to be more flexible in all situations. The versatility of maritime forces allows for more freedom from national borders. If properly organized, trained, and supported, naval forces can function as multinational military assets ready for action.

Maritime forces are able to perform short-notice taskings and are fully capable of responding to Article 5 and non-Article 5 situations. Article 5 situations were defined in the Washington Treaty of 1949 that established the Atlantic Alliance. All parties agreed that:

an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁵

Non-Article 5 situations do not involve collective self-defense but rather crisis situations analogous to the Western European Union's Petersberg Tasks, adopted by the European Union in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.

NATO's traditional orientation regarding collective defense as its sole military function has changed since 1989. The crisis management tasks defined by the April 1999 NATO Strategic Concept are prominent among the Alliance's principal new roles. Naval forces are earmarked as key instruments for present and future operational requirements. For this reason, naval organizations within NATO and Europe such as the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), the Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean

⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty/htm>

(CAFMED), the European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF), and above all the Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) have to continue to adapt to present and future operational demands and “crisis situations.” Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (SNFL) and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM) have also had to adapt from their Cold War mindset to fulfill present and future operational demands.

NATO’s maritime component was originally designed for Article 5 operations—that is, defense against aggression by powers such as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The post-Cold War world since 1989 has been defined primarily by non-Article 5 situations. For this reason, NATO and European naval forces have had to adapt to meet non-Article 5 crisis response challenges. Improvements in power projection and increased interoperability are needed for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 purposes. With this in mind, the new STRIKFORSOUTH as part of the NATO structure is to be prepared:

To conduct maritime striking and multinational amphibious/expeditionary operations and to support and/or reinforce both inter/intra-regionally. COMSTRIKFORSOUTH is also to contribute to the preservation of peace and the promotion of stability through cooperation and dialogue, participate in crisis management and be prepared to plan and execute, or provide support for, expanded roles and missions, as assigned by CINCSOUTH.⁶

If STRIKFORSOUTH is to be capable of performing its potential and probable missions, its capabilities will have to be improved. This will require the will and commitment of the member countries: Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These nations must provide the money and resources necessary to build and maintain the military forces needed. The

⁶ STRIKFORSOUTH Operational Concept Brief, 11 July 2000.

non-Article 5 challenges faced by STRIKFORSOUTH may be less predictable than the Cold War situations NATO had previously prepared for. The new situations may call for naval power projection, rapid reaction naval forces, naval deterrence forces, and joint or combined actions. The need to be able to respond to emergent challenges effectively has not changed and will not change in the future for naval forces. The implementation of STRIKFORSOUTH improvement plans will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. Many of the adaptations taking place in STRIKFORSOUTH need in varying degrees to be pursued within the framework of European naval organizations.

Naval command organizations such as EUROMARFOR, CAFMED, and EMMF are intended to be made available for WEU and future EU-led operations and to be used within the framework of the “Petersberg Tasks” to accelerate and coordinate responses to potential crisis situations. The EU is calling for improvements in naval capabilities, but the EU’s member nations are unlikely to make those improvements soon. NATO and European naval organizations have to adapt to the changing international security environment, and make corresponding improvements and adaptations in their capabilities.

The NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative goals are to “ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges.”⁷ For these initiatives to get positive results, the United States has to take the lead and remain involved. According to Walter Slocombe, then the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

⁷ NATO factsheet, “NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative”, Available [Online]: http://www.nato.int/isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/cristallina/ConvertDocCGI_cristallina.

The U.S. will remain fully engaged in European security issues, so neither politically nor militarily is there any question of Europe needing to prepare for a U.S. withdrawal from Europe. Indeed, it is overwhelmingly likely that in any situation where involvement of military forces is justified and where NATO is prepared to authorize a military operation, the U.S. will be part of the operation.⁸

C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This thesis analyzes the evolving role in European and “out of area” contingencies of STRIKFORSOUTH, EMMF, EUROMARFOR, CAFMED, SNFL, and SNFM and examine the implications for NATO and the U.S. Navy. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to the topic and an explanation of its importance. It also discusses the methodology: this thesis is based on a qualitative analysis of scholarly and journalistic sources, including primary and secondary sources. Chapter 2 reviews the organizational and capability adaptations within NATO and more limited multinational naval organizations under NATO auspices or involving NATO European allies since 1989. It also considers how the EU and the WEU have adapted to changing requirements within their own more limited multinational naval organizations since 1989. Chapter 3 discusses the adaptations to the changing security environment and how they affect the Alliance. It also examines potential future adaptation requirements, given the external security environment and the dynamics within the Alliance. Chapter 4 examines how the adaptations within the Alliance’s naval organizations since 1989 affect the United States, NATO, and the EU.

⁸ Slocombe, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996, p. 4, quoted in David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 208.

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II. ORGANIZATIONAL AND CAPABILITY ADAPTATIONS

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991 some of the crises in the Euro-Atlantic region have been dealt with by multinational forces under the auspices of the United Nations and/or other regional security and political organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and the European Union (EU). As the world's population continues to grow, environmental and economic stresses will contribute to competition over natural resources, including the oceans and seas.⁹ This competition, coupled with increased threats of terrorism, religious persecution, ethnic rivalries, mass migration, and nationalism, will increase the need for more flexible, mobile, and capable military forces that are unhindered by national borders.

No area in the world is more susceptible to these factors of conflict than Europe's new strategic "arc of crisis." This arc runs from North Africa and the Mediterranean into the Middle East and Southwest Asia.¹⁰ Maritime forces offer the versatile and multi-purpose characteristics that can meet the diverse emergent challenges of those regions.

Naval forces also must maintain the ability to carry out traditional roles such as projecting power to maintain political influence, and protecting sea-lanes for economic prosperity and communication.

⁹ James O. Ellis Jr., "Traditional Naval Roles," in Richard H. Shultz and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., *The Role of Naval Forces in 21st-Century Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000), p. 141.

¹⁰ Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Ian O. Lesser. "Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks," *NATO Review*. vol. 44, no. 3 (May 1996), Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-6.htm>

Since 1949, NATO has been the primary defense structure for its members on both sides of the Atlantic. American naval forces, in cooperation with other NATO maritime forces, have become the primary guarantors of political and military stability in the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. In the post-Cold War era, NATO navies have provided naval warfighting power to promote peace, stability, and economic growth throughout the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. Given rising demands for naval forces in troubled regions outside the traditional NATO area of operations, the NATO allies must continue to adapt their military structures, policies, and postures.

A. WEU HISTORY THROUGH THE COLD WAR

The Brussels Treaty, signed in 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, furnished the basis for the WEU, which was established in 1954 as part of the modified Brussels Treaty. A response to the Soviet Union's establishment of Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe after World War II, the Brussels Treaty was signed to help Western European countries pursue collective self-defense. Western European countries realized that a commitment to mutual defense against armed attack was paramount. The Brussels Treaty reflected their initial commitment to collective defense, but they realized that they needed more defensive capability to balance and deter the Soviet Union. An advance in collective defense came with the Washington Treaty of 1949, which created NATO. The countries joining the five signers of the 1948 Brussels Treaty in the Washington Treaty were Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. The Washington Treaty brought the United States into collective defense commitments in Europe and made NATO the primary defensive structure in Europe.

From 1954 to 1984, while NATO served as the principal Allied defense organization in Europe, the WEU promoted the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and stressed political development, closer cooperation with other European organizations, and unity among its member nations: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom. The WEU had no military structures or forces under its sole direction because the member nations explicitly assigned all military defense responsibilities to NATO under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).¹¹

In 1984, the WEU began to redefine and expand its role. Its members met to discuss the concept of a West European security identity and the gradual linking of defense policies among member nations outside NATO. The member country foreign and defense ministers realized that common defense and the security of Europe needed more emphasis and planning so they created the frame work outlined in the Rome Declaration.¹² The Rome Declaration brought to the forefront the issue of the WEU considering the implications for Europe of crises in other regions and the possibility of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance through European contributions. The WEU defense and foreign ministers continued to seek harmonization among themselves in the fields of defense, arms control and disarmament, East-West security relations, and the further development of political cooperation among member nations. They stressed the need for security

¹¹ Western European Union, Nine-Power Conference, Final Act Chapter IV, October 3, 1954. Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/eng/docu/d431003a.htm>

¹² Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration, October 27, 1984. Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/84-rome.htm>

within the Atlantic Alliance and recommitted themselves to discussing defense matters within the WEU Assembly.¹³

B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEU AS THE DEFENSE ARM OF THE EU

External security issues were never among the EU's original goals because NATO was the principal means by which most EU members assured their defense and security. In the early 1990s, however, the EU expanded its involvement in the political-military realm with its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. Trying to bolster its political position on the world stage and to gain a military role commensurate with its position in the world economic market, the EU referred to the independently established institution, the WEU.

As the Council of Ministers of the WEU noted in 1991, the Maastricht Treaty called for the "WEU to be developed as the defense component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."¹⁴ In the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, the WEU Council of Ministers indicated that "military units of the WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."¹⁵ Furthering the EU's expanding role in building a common European security and defense policy, these "Petersberg Tasks" were incorporated into the

¹³ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration, October 27, 1984. "Rome Declaration," Par 8, WEU Council of Ministers Rome Declaration. Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/84-rome.htm>

¹⁴ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Maastricht, December 10, 1991. "Maastricht Declaration," Par 2 of Part II, The Role of the Western European Union with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance."

¹⁵ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992, "Petersberg Declaration," par.4 of Part II, "On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role," quoted in David Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p.209.

1997 Amsterdam Treaty under the new Article 17 (formerly Article J.7), which also opened up the prospect of a common defense and potential integration of the WEU into the EU.¹⁶

The WEU and its relations with NATO were considered the backbone of the new European Security and Defense Identity until late 1998, when British policy changes initiated a new phase in the pursuit of the European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP. This remarkable change in British policy toward a common defense and security policy took place at St. Malo in December 1998 during the British-French summit where it was decided that:

To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.¹⁷

While previous attempts at developing an ESDP had been unsuccessful, agreement between France and Britain, traditionally opposite in their thinking on defense matters, brought hope and promise to achieving the initiative's objectives. Recognizing the EU's inability to handle crises such as those in the Balkans, the EU member states declared their intention at subsequent summit meetings to reinforce the CFSP by developing their own collective military capability to respond to international crisis situations.

¹⁶ European Union, Treaty on European Union, 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17 (ex Article J.7). Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.

¹⁷ Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo, France 3-4 December 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1795>.

The EU summit meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 specified targets that the EU countries should aim for in terms of military capabilities. The EU agreed on a “headline goal,” to be achieved by 2003, and called for an ability:

to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000 – 60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.¹⁸

Additionally, the EU summit meeting at Helsinki also called for development and coordination of monitoring and early warning systems, an increased number of readily deployable forces, enhanced strategic sea lift capabilities, establishment of a European air transport command, and new permanent political-military bodies under the European Council. These new bodies will be the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee of the European Union, and the Military Staff of the European Union. The EU summit meeting in Nice solidified these new bodies by deciding to place them on a permanent basis.¹⁹

These new permanent political-military bodies were created to enable “the EU to assume its responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management

¹⁸ European Union Presidency Conclusion, Helsinki 10 and 11 December 1999. Available [Online]: http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm Annex IV.

¹⁹ European Union Presidency Conclusion, Nice 7,8, and 9 December 2000, Introduction par 2. Available [Online]: <http://www.ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cmf/MAX>.

tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg Tasks.”²⁰ The PSC will deal with all matters falling within the CFSP, help define policies, and provide guidance for all other EU political-military bodies.²¹ The European Union Military Committee “is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework.”²² The Military Staff of the EU is the source of the EU’s military expertise that performs “‘early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces’ and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the European Union Military Committee.”²³ Even with the EU’s continued advances in preparing to meet the “headline goal,” which calls for many ground force improvements, the EU continually fails to make more than minimal references to naval improvement requirements.

The EU’s declared goals, which reflect a continued desire on the part of the EU states to reduce their reliance on the United States military and assume greater responsibility for regional defense and security, have not yet been fully achieved. The EU’s interest in accepting greater responsibility in international security was articulated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The member states were not ready to supply the tools needed to meet their objectives because they lacked the political will to do so. Since 1992

²⁰ European Union Presidency Conclusion, Nice 7,8, and 9 December 2000, annex IV. Available [Online]: <http://www.ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cmf/MAX>

²¹ European Union Presidency Conclusion, Nice 7,8, and 9 December 2000, annex III. Available [Online]: <http://www.ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cmf/MAX>

²² European Union Presidency Conclusion, Nice 7,8, and 9 December 2000, annex IV. Available [Online]: <http://www.ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cmf/MAX>

²³ European Union Presidency Conclusion, Nice 7,8, and 9 December 2000, annex V. Available [Online]: <http://www.ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.cmf/MAX>

NATO European nations have cut their defense budgets by twenty-two percent in real terms.²⁴ NATO European policy makers do not see an identifiable enemy requiring military precautions comparable to those during the Cold War. They see a greater need to spend public funds in the domestic arena and thereby support the expanding European Union socially and economically. For these reasons, the strength of the resolve behind the CFSP has been questioned; and this resolve is unlikely to be substantially bolstered in the foreseeable future. With the political leaders of the EU calling for improved military forces but unlikely to seek significant capabilities beyond their stated “headline goal” to be fulfilled by 2003, the United States and the other NATO allies are needed to fill the void. This is particularly true with regard to naval capabilities because the need for naval forces is increasing for various reasons, as noted earlier; and the European Union’s declared goals give little attention to naval capabilities. Instead, the EU has chosen to concentrate on ground forces for peacekeeping.

U.S. maritime forces of the early and mid-twentieth century embodied many of the flexible attributes that today’s forces have but were called on primarily to carry out traditional naval activities in warfighting and protection of communications and supply. New technology and warfighting advances were pursued during the two World Wars and the Cold War, with increasing attention to the need to prepare for multinational operations in coordination with allied navies. This need to create multinational coalition maritime forces during conflict will persist during the twenty-first century due to multipolar threats, increased demands from the political arena, and economic competition.

²⁴ “The NATO Capability Gap,” *Strategic Survey 1999/2000* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000), pp. 19-20.

C. BUILDING UNITED STATES AND NATO MULTINATIONAL MARITIME FORCES

A navy is a state's primary instrument of maritime force. Deciding what to use this force for is determined by political, economic, and military needs or goals. These choices are made according to a nation's stated goals, perceived threats, and economic opportunities. In the late nineteenth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept of sea power as a means of offensive sea control transformed American naval strategy and force structures toward a concentrated battle fleet bent on the destruction of the enemy fleet.²⁵ In Mahan's view, commercial shipping constituted the primary form of movement for trade, and there was therefore a clear justification for a strong Navy to protect it. Not only did the Navy exist to protect commercial ships but also to enforce decisions affecting economic, geographical, political, and cultural interests at home and abroad.²⁶

This doctrine of offensive sea control offered the Navy scope for initiative and made it an integral part of United States national policy and military strategy during the Cold War and beyond. Mahan believed that "the purpose of naval strategy is to gain control of the sea." This belief was in many ways foreshadowed by George Washington, who held that "in any operation and under all circumstances a decisive Naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle and the basis in which every hope of success must ultimately depend."²⁷ The concept of "control of the sea" via naval

²⁵ George W. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy 1890-1990* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 1.

²⁶ Phillip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Modern Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 451.

²⁷ George Washington, statement of 15 July 1780, quoted in Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973) p. 38.

superiority was transferred to the multinational maritime forces of NATO in opposing the formidable Soviet naval threat in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean during the Cold War.

NATO was in reality a maritime coalition from the very beginning during the Cold War. Sea power--both forward-deployed and on the high seas, led by the United States Navy and continually applied in cooperation with the other maritime powers of NATO--constituted a key component of the overall deterrence posture and collective defense of NATO against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners. The collective defense pledge was defined in Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²⁸

The maritime forces of NATO played such a significant role in this collective defense at the beginning of the Cold War because the allied military high command did not believe that its combined land forces could successfully stop a Soviet ground assault in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, or the Middle East. Sea power was seen as essential to assist the NATO powers in opposing the massive Soviet land forces. Naval planning outlined as one scenario that in the event of war the first task would be for naval forces to secure the seas in order to evacuate all Western land forces from Western Europe. NATO's maritime forces, led by the United States, would secure the lines of

²⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty/htm>

communication across the Atlantic to Canada and the United States, establish forward bases in Iceland and the Azores, and commence offensive operations in the Mediterranean. Offensive operations were to be carried out by projecting power ashore with numerous aircraft carriers plus supporting naval forces to slow the movement of Soviet ground forces throughout Europe.²⁹

The ability of the allies to take the war to the Soviets would rely on NATO's maritime forces to secure lines of communications and supply routes from the United States to Europe as well to project power onto the periphery of Europe in the face of a formidable Soviet naval submarine threat. NATO planners intended to carry out the convoy aspect of the war in the same way that supply lines were protected during World War II. To improve their ability to protect convoys, the United States Navy and the Royal Navy began coordinating planning to standardize operations, logistics, and communications in the event of war.

By late 1950, NATO realized that planning to liberate Western Europe after Soviet conquest would be a disaster, so policy shifted to holding the line as far east as possible. This policy shift placed greater pressure on Alliance maritime forces to get reinforcement troops across the Atlantic to the front lines on the East-West border even more quickly. To emphasize the importance and responsibility of naval forces in the defense of Western Europe, naval forces were placed under a unified command, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, SACLANT. Prior to the establishment of NATO's naval commands several multinational naval exercises were carried out involving member nations. In 1949-1951

²⁹ Joel J. Sokolsky. *Seapower in the Nuclear Age: The United States Navy and NATO 1949-1980*. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press) p. 8.

exercises VERITY, ACTIVITY, and PROGRESS were carried out involving British, Dutch, Norwegian, French, and Danish naval forces preparing for convoy protection and anti-submarine warfare; they exercised communications and tactical procedures.³⁰ Further exercises carried out in 1951 involved the British, French, Italian, and American navies in the Mediterranean testing convoy escort, surface capabilities, anti-submarine warfare, and carrier operations.

D. INITIAL NAVAL COMMAND STRUCTURES IN NATO

In January 1952, Lynde McCormick, USN, was appointed SACLANT, a command at the same level as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR. Further command posts, Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) and Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean (CINCAFMED), were created as compensation to the British for the appointment of a United States officer as SACLANT, but the United States Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean remained subordinate to SACEUR.³¹ In late 1952, NATO held its first major naval exercise, MAINBRACE, to test capabilities and allied cooperation in defending the Scandinavian allies from Soviet aggression. This exercise helped in coordinating plans for defense of the region but also served a political purpose in that it reassured the Scandinavian allies that they would be protected by the Alliance in case of aggression.³²

To satisfy member nations that had historically protected the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean “a somewhat awkward compromise” was devised regarding command arrangements. SACEUR established a subordinate Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces

³⁰ Sokolsky, p. 20.

³¹ Sokolsky, pp. 17-18.

South, CINCSOUTH. CINCSOUTH established three subordinate commands for air, land, and sea components of allied forces under his command. The sea component command, Commander Allied Naval Forces South (COMNAVSOUTH), was headed by CINCSOUTH himself, a United States Navy Admiral. Under COMNAVSOUTH were French, Italian, and United States forces—including the U.S. Sixth Fleet. British naval forces in the Mediterranean were not subordinate to this command structure but were available for the collective defense of NATO. They operated under their own command organization and protected Britain's national interests in the eastern Mediterranean region.³³

With the admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO in February 1952, further naval command changes took place. The air and land forces of Athens and Ankara came under CINCSOUTH, but their naval units came under a new NATO command, Allied Forces Mediterranean, AFMED. As Joel Sokolsky has observed, “With the creation of AFMED, NAVSOUTH was abolished.”³⁴ Naval forces from Italy, France, Greece, and Turkey fell under the command of CINCAFMED, who was also the British Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet, and responsible for protecting the sea lines of communications across the Mediterranean.³⁵

Separated from the AFMED command structure was the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which remained under CINCSOUTH as Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, or

³² Sokolsky, p. 21.

³³ Sokolsky, p. 29.

³⁴ Sokolsky, p. 30.

³⁵ Sokolsky, pp. 29-30.

STRIKFORSOUTH. The Sixth Fleet's primary mission changed from defending the sea lines of communication (AFMED's responsibility) to conventional and nuclear air support for allied armies resisting the advance of Soviet land and air forces. Its continuing missions would include the conduct of amphibious operations to counterattack the advancing Soviet land and air threat. This would be the first flexible and mobile carrier striking force that would primarily be used to project power ashore in support of SACEUR's ground components and the primary NATO mission of defending Western Europe. This change in the command structure was significant because naval forces were now directly committed to the ground campaign to defend Southern and Western Europe.³⁶

The first major large-scale NATO exercises held in the Mediterranean were MEDFLEXABLE and WELDFAST. They took place in 1953 and 1954 under the direction of CINCSOUTH. Further exercises were held by AFSOUTH to practice implementing war plans and securing sea lines of communications.³⁷ With the establishment of these integrated military structures and continued multinational exercises, NATO maritime forces believed they were ready for all plausible contingencies. The positive results gained from these exercises paved the way for further implementation of the naval multi-nationality concept within NATO.

The maritime structure established by NATO involved multiple commands. Unlike the ground component commands under SACEUR, there was no single allied commander in charge of all NATO maritime forces in time of war. SACEUR would have

³⁶ Sokolsky, p. 30.

³⁷ Sokolsky, p. 35.

operational control over the naval components of CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH, but would not have control over British forces in the English Channel or forces assigned to SACLANT. Many of the maritime commanders, however, had dual-hatted positions that allowed them to control their national forces at all times while working with allied navies and staffs in the Atlantic or Mediterranean. Indeed, NATO maritime commanders performed peacetime functions as national commanders, and practiced for wartime situations with allied navies in exercises. This gave NATO a permanent on-call standing maritime contingent immediately ready for action in the form of major British and United States assets, plus the naval capabilities of the other allies, particularly France.

From 1958 to 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle conducted a gradual withdrawal of French forces from NATO. France's incremental withdrawal from NATO military institutions was conducted in conjunction with de Gaulle's denunciations of the Alliance's military integration, and many thought that de Gaulle would propose a revamping of the Alliance before the denunciation deadline of 1969.³⁸ The gradual withdrawal of French maritime forces was finalized when they were removed from the Mediterranean and "reconstituted as a primarily Atlantic fleet of 250,000 tons and 270 naval aircraft."³⁹ The withdrawal of French naval forces in the Mediterranean from NATO command structures began in December 1958.⁴⁰

³⁸ Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 140.

³⁹ Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 123.

⁴⁰ Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. p. 137.

In a belated acknowledgement of the difficulties engrained in the command structure, in 1967 NATO created its first multinational naval force, Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL), to participate in allied exercises and joint maritime training, and to demonstrate the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.⁴¹ It consisted of four to six frigates and destroyers that would embody the versatile, highly mobile, and flexible forces needed to conduct action against immediate threats to the Alliance throughout NATO's area of responsibility. These forces, while not as formidable as a carrier battlegroup, served as a symbol of the Alliance's solidarity that could go promptly to the threatened area and be reinforced by other allied naval units inport, underway, or deployed throughout the region. In conjunction with SNFL forces deployed every six months, NATO relied on the naval forces of smaller member nations to patrol their own coastal waters and to protect against Soviet submarine threats and coastal blockades.

With the Atlantic region covered by SNFL and coastal patrols, the Mediterranean soon saw an increase in Soviet naval activity. In response to these developments, in May 1969 NATO's Defense Planning Committee approved the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean. This naval force, composed of four to six destroyers and frigates, would play an important deterrent role. It opposed the Soviet deployments by showing the Alliance's determination and solidarity in deploying under one flag as SNFL did in the Atlantic. The Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean was assigned to NAVSOUTH and later AFMED and would be deployed forty-three times from 1970 to 1991 when a permanent force, Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM), replaced it.⁴² The deployment of

⁴¹ Michele, Cosentino. "Multinationality: The way ahead for Western maritime power." *United States Naval Institute. Proceedings*; (Annapolis; March 1998). p 1.

⁴² Allied Forces Southern Europe: AFSOUTH, 1951-1999: Forty Eight Years Working for Peace and
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SNFL and the Naval On-Call Forces Mediterranean was a beginning that could help to improve the fragmented command structure; but U.S. carrier battlegroups and British naval units constituted the bulk of NATO's maritime forces.

NATO did not face a large number of permanently deployed Soviet naval forces on the high seas until the late 1960s. This allowed NATO time to prepare for a Soviet naval assault. The Soviets would have had to move out to sea to attack NATO maritime assets, and this would have given NATO time to activate its maritime assets to prepare for the assault. Even if the Soviets had launched a ground assault first, NATO maritime assets would still have had ample time to prepare for the Soviet naval assault. While this was not an optimal situation, NATO naval leaders believed they had no need to revamp NATO's command structure because its maritime strategy could be employed in time to counter any Soviet naval threat effectively.

This naval command structure was maintained with few changes until the end of the Cold War. Despite continuity in the command structure, NATO maritime forces had to adapt their tactics and capabilities to meet the growing Soviet naval battlegroup and submarine threat of the 1970s and 1980s. The United States Navy and other NATO maritime forces continued to meet the Soviet challenges by building larger force structures and hedging against the threat of Soviet aggression. In such a war NATO's ability to secure, deny, and exploit the seas would be crucial to the war effort to protect the seaward approaches to Europe for communications and supply. These aspects of naval warfare were crucial during the Cold War and NATO's maritime component was ready for those

challenges. Once the Cold War ended, NATO planners and naval leaders realized that they had to adapt to the security environment of the post-Cold War world.

E. NEW COMMAND STRUCTURES

The process of changing the military command structure can be traced back to the 1990 London Declaration in which NATO leaders called for a process to adapt to the changes that were taking place in Europe.⁴³ Another development that helped lead to changing the command structures was the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept in 1991. The 1991 Strategic Concept called for greater attention to the Alliance's security tasks and to the strategic environment, which was evolving much more quickly and much more unpredictably than expected. The 1991 Strategic Concept also called for smaller forces with "enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary," for purposes of crisis management and opposing attacks against any ally.⁴⁴ These forces were to be able to rapidly meet any new challenge of a limited scope. Although this concept sounds like NATO was readying itself for the peacekeeping missions of the middle to late 1990s, it was not. NATO's "mission remained collective defense against aggression affecting Alliance territory, not intervention beyond that territory."⁴⁵ In 1994, the Military Committee launched the Long-Term Study (LTS), which called for integrated military structures that would facilitate the construction of ESDI within NATO and allow all participating allies to have a more active role in the decision-making process.

⁴³ NATO Ministerial Communiqués: London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>

⁴⁴ North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, November 1991, par. 47, quoted in David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. (Washington, D.C.; United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998). p. 192.

As part of the adaptation process, efforts to improve the Alliance's capabilities while fulfilling its roles and missions encompassed three fundamental objectives: "the Alliance's military effectiveness had to be ensured; the transatlantic link preserved; and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) developed within the Alliance."⁴⁶ The key would be to make adaptations to enable the Alliance to expand with the times and to incorporate changes as necessary to meet the threat. NATO would need to be able to meet the diverse challenges facing its member nations, to include Article 5 and non-Article 5 crises. The new command structure also has to allow for the growth and flexibility needed for the addition of new members into NATO.

The Strategic Commands are responsible for the overall planning, direction, and conduct of Alliance military activities under their authority. The Regional Commands subordinate to the Strategic Commands are responsible for planning and execution of Alliance military activities and may delegate responsibility to the Component Commands or Joint Sub-Regional Commands under their authority. With the new command and control structure comes a new concept of how to do business. The interrelationships between commands allow for a more flexible way to conduct operations while relying more heavily on multinational forces. The supported-supporting command relationship enables commands to transfer responsibility for certain activities more easily to other commands, thus providing more flexibility. Commands will be more interdependent because of limited personnel in each command. Regionally based headquarters will be

⁴⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 192.

⁴⁶ General Klaus Naumann. "NATO's New Military Command Structure," *NATO Review*, vol. 46, no.1(Spring 1998). Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-03.htm>

able to receive forces and support forces from other regions if necessary and with greater ease.⁴⁷ Each command will be manned multinationally, with representation of all member countries at the Strategic Command level. This will allow for greater reinforcement capacity and wider participation in multinational operations at the regional command level.⁴⁸

F. NEW CONCEPTS

Allowing for the changing security environment, the new command structure--as endorsed at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit--takes into account the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), ESDI, and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) concepts. The new command structure within NATO also takes into account the anticipated requirements that NATO capabilities and common assets could be released to the EU for use in EU-led operations as discussed at the June 1999 European Council in Cologne. This EU Council approved the transfer of WEU institutional functions from the WEU to the EU. Operations known in NATO parlance as non-Article 5 operations do not involve collective self-defense but rather crisis situations, and are called the Petersberg Tasks in the EU. This integrated military structure allows the Alliance an enhanced capacity to perform the new range of roles and missions described by NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept.

One of the main purposes of the 1999 Strategic Concept is to enable the Alliance to deal with future security challenges and risks. Europe has seen the threat of a general war subside but the risks and uncertainties facing the Allies have increased; therefore, the 1999 Strategic Concept calls for the following elements: "the preservation of the

⁴⁷ General Klaus Naumann. "NATO's New Military Command Structure," *NATO Review*, vol. 46, no. 1(Spring 1998). Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-03.htm>

⁴⁸ General Klaus Naumann. "NATO's New Military Command Structure," *NATO Review*, vol. 46, no.

transatlantic link, the maintenance of effective military capabilities, the development of ESDI within the Alliance, conflict prevention and crisis management, partnership with cooperation and dialogue, enlargement, arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.”⁴⁹

Further development of ESDI within the NATO framework means: ensuring development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the EU and NATO based on mechanisms established between NATO and the WEU; participation of non-EU European Allies; and practical arrangements for EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO’s collective assets and capabilities.⁵⁰

The 1999 Strategic Concept also calls for continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance’s missions. Key goals in this regard are specified in NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI is “designed to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges.”⁵¹ During the Cold War, NATO planners were primarily concerned with maintaining the capabilities needed to resist potential aggression or coercion by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, but in today’s security environment NATO must be ready to deploy forces beyond its borders to manage crises. DCI aims are grouped in five major areas: mobility and deployability,

1 (Spring 1998). Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-03.htm>

⁴⁹ Anthony Craig, “A New Strategic Concept for a New Era,” *NATO Review*, vol. 47 no. 2 (Summer 1999). Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9902-04.htm>.

⁵⁰ NATO Factsheet, “The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), Developing further the European Security and Defense Identity.” Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/esdi.htm>

⁵¹ NATO Factsheet, “NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative”. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm>

sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications. These aims are needed to significantly enhance European militaries to lessen the capabilities gap between themselves and the armed forces of the United States.⁵² With continued focus on the key technological, doctrinal, and organizational elements mentioned in the aims for DCI, military capabilities could be strengthened as well as the “European pillar” of NATO.

To help in this process, NATO’s maritime forces must continue to maintain and enhance their capabilities and incorporate technological advances into their warfare systems because the U.S.-European capabilities gap is widening, as became evident during Operation Allied Force in 1999. More than 70 percent of the firepower employed was supplied by the United States. Only Britain and the United States contributed cruise missiles. Only 10 percent of allied aircraft were able to conduct precision bomb attacks. Only France among the European Allies made a significant contribution to nighttime bombing raids. The United States was the only member country able to contribute strategic bombers and stealth aircraft to the operation.⁵³ The European Allies also lacked reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft.

These deficiencies have to be addressed for a true coalition of NATO members to take part in demanding multinational operations. With these problems in mind, the structures and initiatives involving naval forces, which are earmarked as key instruments for the new Command Structure, may help NATO and the EU to work together more

⁵² Elinor Sloan, “DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs,” *NATO Review*, vol. 48 (Spring/Summer 2000). Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0001-02.htm>.

⁵³ Elinor Sloan, “DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs,” *NATO Review*, vol. 48 (Spring/Summer 2000). Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2000/0001-02.htm>

closely. By working together, they may improve their capacity to effectively engage opposing forces and respond to crisis situations by being forward-deployed, sustained, flexible, mobile, and interoperable.

The new command structure is designed to be operationally effective and to facilitate integration within the Alliance. As part of NATO's new command structure, regional headquarters of AFSOUTH, STRIKFORSOUTH and a sister amphibious command, Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean (CAFMED), coordinate forces that may see action in future multinational operations. The European Multi-national Maritime Force (EMMF) concept is yet another naval force concept that has been approved by NATO for possible future use. An EMMF force could be formed on a case-by-case basis to deal with crisis situations, with the concurrence with the North Atlantic Council. Its employment could also be EU-led and directed toward the accomplishment of the "Petersberg Tasks." This concept therefore falls under the auspices of the development of ESDI within NATO, including the identification of NATO assets and capabilities that could be made available for EU-led crisis operations. In another ESDI-related development, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have identified naval forces to be made available for WEU/EU-led operations through EUROMARFOR.

G. CURRENT NAVAL ORGANIZATIONS

Since the end of the Cold War the concept of destroying the enemy fleet in a head to head "blue water" engagement has become less prominent. Today's maritime forces use advanced submarines, aircraft, and precision-guided bombs and missiles to achieve battlespace dominance or sea control as well to project power ashore. Today's littoral-focused navy operates within three hundred miles of the coastline with an emphasis on

controlling the sea lanes and the inland areas adjacent to those sea lanes while projecting power from the sea to land.

1. STRIKFORSOUTH

The post-Cold War scene in Europe since 1989 has been defined primarily by non-Article 5 situations. For this reason, NATO and European naval forces have had to adapt to meet non-Article 5 crisis response challenges. Improvements in power projection capability, C3 (command, control, and communications), and increased interoperability are needed to conduct no-fly zone enforcement, embargoes, reconnaissance, surveillance, air suppression, and amphibious/expeditionary operations. With this in mind, the new Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH), an exercise-coordinating agency during the Cold War, is being recast as part of the new NATO structure:

COMSTRIKSOUTH is to be prepared to conduct maritime striking and multinational amphibious/expeditionary operations and to support and/or reinforce both inter/intra-regionally. He is also to contribute to the preservation of peace and the promotion of stability through cooperation and dialogue, participate in crisis management and be prepared to plan and execute, or provide support for, expanded roles and missions, as assigned by CINCSOUTH.⁵⁴

In September 1999 STRIKFORSOUTH became a NATO force structure headquarters under the new command structure. A Regional Reaction Force Headquarters, STRIKFORSOUTH has eight participating Allies: Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its core capabilities include: rapidly deployable sea-based command, control, and communications assets with embedded forward headquarters; multiple carrier battlegroups; surface and

subsurface strike platforms armed with Tomahawk missiles; multi-national amphibious attack forces for simultaneous or sequential employment; and sea-based expeditionary logistics. Its operational tasks include: conducting theater deterrence and shaping operations, enabling force operations, regionally based CJTF operations, out-of-area operations, independent small-scale crisis response operations. Moreover, it provides headquarters for ESDI (that is, EU-led) operations and NATO power projection operations. It also serves as an operational theater headquarters for sustained operations.⁵⁵ Its areas primarily include the Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf.⁵⁶

The changes in STRIKFORSOUTH from the Cold War roles it once fulfilled came about because of operational demands in the Balkans starting in 1995. STRIKFORSOUTH commanded U.S. forces preparing for intervention in the Kosovo conflict; and when Operation Allied Force began in March 1999, other NATO members came under the authority of AFSOUTH.

The benefits of STRIKFORSOUTH for preparing for multinational operations are many. As a force structure headquarters, participating members only have to agree among themselves on the changes they see fit for the organization. This includes modifying budgets, personnel structures, forces assigned to the command, exercises, and other activities.⁵⁷ This allows for a greater chance to pursue enhanced interoperability among participating forces. It also allows for capability improvements to deal with a broad

⁵⁴ STRIKFORSOUTH Operational Concept Brief, 11 July 2000.

⁵⁵ STRIKFORSOUTH Operational Concept Brief, 11 July 2000.

⁵⁶ STRIKFORSOUTH Operational Concept Brief, 11 July 2000.

⁵⁷ David S. Yost. *NATO's New Roles: Implications for the U.S. Navy*. August, 31, 2000. p. 21.

spectrum of challenges. This autonomy among participating nations within the regional command structure creates a framework in which the countries and the organization can improve their military posture.

2. CAFMED

With the great latitude that STRIKFORSOUTH has been afforded, it has devised the concept of a Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean (CAFMED). It developed the concept in 1991 within its own amphibious warfare division, and the concept was approved by SACEUR in November 1995.⁵⁸ CAFMED is the means by which STRIKFORSOUTH seeks to enhance the interoperability and effectiveness of the multinational NATO amphibious forces in the Mediterranean, along with additional forces provided by member countries. The aim is to be able to deploy a brigade-size landing force tailored to its mission. The force has to be self-sustaining for 15 days, and supported by adequate naval ship and air assets. CAFMED is not a standing force, but it is readily deployable because member countries have earmarked forces for specific purposes. It would take time to structure and prepare the force needed, but the right force would be deployed as quickly as possible. CAFMED's missions in peacetime as well as crisis situations would include the seizure of choke points, islands, and port facilities; amphibious assault operations; and special operations.⁵⁹ Its forces will be flexible and expeditionary in nature, capable of performing not only traditional amphibious assault operations, but also non-traditional tasks called for in today's changing security environment.

⁵⁸ Paolo Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership for NATO Amphibious Forces," *Jane's International Defense Review*, July 1, 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord.htm>

⁵⁹ Paolo Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership for NATO Amphibious Forces," *Jane's International*

The CAFMED concept has its origins in the United States Commander Combined Amphibious Task Force (CCATF)/Commander Combined Landing Force (CCLF) concept. The responsibilities will be split between staffs assigned to specific headquarters but composed of officers from all the participating countries. The multinational planning staff is made up of five marines and three naval officers from the participating countries. The CAFMED concept has been implemented in the “DESTINED GLORY” series of exercises first held in 1995 and most recently held in the Aegean Sea in October 2000.⁶⁰ Further exercises continue to broaden the spectrum of tasks that CAFMED can undertake in coordination with STRIKFORSOUTH. In 1995, CAFMED undertook the exercise “DYNAMIC IMPACT” which practiced reinforcement and withdrawal of UN troops from a peacekeeping mission in which the situation escalated from easy to difficult. It showed how amphibious forces can be used to project power ashore or respond to crisis situations. The Commander of AFSOUTH regarded the exercise as “a watershed in the history of NATO” because of the tactical interplay between nations and the interoperable training that took place.⁶¹

In 1998, exercise “DYNAMIC RESPONSE” demonstrated NATO’s capacity to reinforce the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia.⁶² This exercise was a primary example of how important it is to have amphibious forces in the Mediterranean theater.

Defense Review, July 1, 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.janesonline.com>

⁶⁰ “Dutch Marines defeat manning trend,” *Jane’s Navy International*, June 1, 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.janesonline.com>

⁶¹ Mike Wells, “Exercise Destined Glory,” *Jane’s Navy International*, August 1, 1995. Available [Online]: <http://fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord.htm>

⁶² Paolo Valpolini, “Dynamic Response Puts SFOR Reserve Forces to the test,” *Jane’s Navy International*, vol 103, June 1, 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord.htm>

These forces could carry out non-traditional amphibious missions while still maintaining the ability to carry out the traditional missions that could be required at any time. CAFMED forces, with STRIKFORSOUTH leadership, planning, and support, are able to sustain all the characteristics of a traditional expeditionary naval force while maintaining the power projection assets needed for today's operations, including a high level of operational readiness.

3. EUROMARFOR

The EUROMARFOR concept was devised to contribute to the development of ESDI. At the WEU ministerial meeting in Lisbon in May 1995, Ministers welcomed the decision of France, Italy, and Spain to organize EUROMARFOR. Portugal, the fourth member of EUROMARFOR, announced its decision to join on the same day as France, Italy, and Spain; and Portugal has participated from the outset.⁶³ Membership has been open to other WEU members, although none have to date joined. The participating countries have declared that their EUROMARFOR-designated assets are "'forces answerable to the WEU', that they would be employed as a priority in this framework, that they could likewise be employed in the framework of NATO, so as to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, and that the fulfillment of their missions will not prejudice the participation of their units in the common defense missions provided for by Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."⁶⁴ EUROMARFOR is a non-standing pre-configured force with maritime and amphibious capabilities. The tasks of EUROMARFOR primarily deal with humanitarian aid, search

⁶³ Michael Chichester, "WEU creates EUROMARFOR," *Jane's Navy International*, vol 100, August 1, 1995. Available [Online]: <http://www.fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord.htm>

⁶⁴ WEU Council of Ministers, Lisbon Declaration. Lisbon, 15 May 1995, par. 5. Available [Online]:

and rescue, evacuation, surveillance, maritime police, and maritime control in a crisis area. The participating nations (France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) have indicated that these forces could be made available for WEU, NATO, EU, or UN purposes.⁶⁵ If EUROMARFOR units are used, a high-level inter-governmental committee will establish the terms for its employment and give direction to the leadership. The member countries will be responsible for stipulating the conditions for use of the force by the WEU or any other international organization. Command of the force rotates annually among the member nations.

EUROMARFOR, activated on October 2, 1995, is primarily oriented to the Mediterranean and would be typically composed of an aircraft carrier and four to six escorts, a landing force, amphibious ships, and a combat supply ship. Assets are earmarked by the participating countries, which could assign them to meet any specific WEU, EU, or UN operational request. The participating countries have indicated that their primary intention is to employ EUROMARFOR under WEU control, but it could be deployed under NATO's control. If not deployed for specific missions, it is activated one or two times a year for exercises organized by the WEU permanent planning cell. The permanent cell is made up of four officers, one from each participating country, with a rotating command.⁶⁶

<http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/95-lisbon.htm>

⁶⁵ Peter Howard. "Full-time staff to complement EUROMARFOR," *Jane's Navy International*, June 1, 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord.htm>

⁶⁶ Peter Howard. "Full-time staff to complement EUROMARFOR," *Jane's Navy International*, June 1, 2000. Available [Online]: <http://fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord/htm>

Continued cooperation between the WEU and NATO regarding further development of the CJTF concept is paramount as EUROMARFOR develops through exercises and operations. The potential benefits of EUROMARFOR are noteworthy. First of all, it has not presented additional expenses to member countries because it employs the existing forces and command structures of the member countries. It is pre-structured to meet its deployed challenges. It is non-permanent and assembled on a case-by-case basis to carry out a specific mission that it has trained for in advance. These benefits have been apparent during the exercises in which EUROMARFOR has been activated.⁶⁷ These exercises helped the participating maritime forces work on planning and joint operations and provided valuable practical lessons for future exercises and operations.

4. EMMF

The initiative for the European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) concept comes from an idea presented in 1999 by Dutch Defense minister Frank De Grave and supported by the French.⁶⁸ The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., indicated in April 1999 that the initiative “seeks to capitalize on NATO’s strengths: the existing trained multinational forces; our common doctrine; our practiced exercise structure, and our mature command and control organization.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ EUROMARFOR Brief at Portsmouth Naval Base by Captain Guillermo Valero, Spanish Navy, Commander of the EUROMARFOR Task Group, 19 April 2000.

⁶⁸ Francois Heisbourg, “European Defence: Making it Work,” *Chaillot Papers*, September 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/institute/>.

⁶⁹ Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., SACLANT. “The Future of NATO’s Maritime Forces”, *Jane’s Navy International*, 1 April 1999. Available [Online]: <http://www.fore.thomson.com/janes/psrecord.htm>

The EMMF concept takes into account arrangements previously agreed on by NATO and the WEU for forces available for WEU purposes. The EMMF concept indicates that a maritime force could be constituted under the political and strategic direction of the WEU, with the case-by-case concurrence of the North Atlantic Council. This force could include command and control elements from NATO's command structure and assets from the NATO force structure. These assets could be made available by NATO nations to the WEU. With the concurrence of the WEU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC), non-NATO countries could also participate in an EMMF operation. If activated, EMMF would be open to any NATO country that wanted to participate.

The EMMF concept identifies existing NATO assets and capabilities already required for the full range of Alliance missions, which could be employed subject to the North Atlantic Council's approval to perform "Petersberg Tasks" under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. Given the task-oriented nature of the EMMF, it could be employed as an independent maritime force or as a component of a CJTF as long as it is tailored to the mission. The Deputy SACEUR will be responsible for the turnover process, coordination, and activation, as well as the return of forces to NATO commands from under WEU control. With this in mind, the forces most likely to be assigned to act under WEU control will be those earmarked for NATO and answerable to the WEU. The EMMF concept is a NATO concept developed as a contribution to the further development of ESDI within NATO.

H. CONCLUSIONS

Although the security environment and political landscape in Europe have changed radically, NATO's maritime forces remain essential. With their inherent mobility,

flexibility, endurance, autonomy, and ability to operate without local host nation support, maritime forces are ideally suited to provide peacetime military presence and crisis response. They convey calculated ambiguity and offer a range of calibrated responses. Their presence does not commit the alliance to a given course of action, but provides an array of political and military options. New crisis situations can be expected around NATO's periphery. Naval command organizations (and concepts) such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF could be employed in NATO and EU-led operations. The EU has called for few improvements in naval capabilities, and EU member nations are unlikely to make even minimal improvements soon. The United States, NATO, and European naval organizations have to adapt to the changing international security environment, and make corresponding improvements and adaptations in their capabilities and structures because naval forces are among the most useful assets to deal with these evolving challenges.

In the future, the United States should encourage further development of the naval multinationality concept within NATO to strengthen ESDI and NATO-EU partnership. NATO's DCI goals are to "ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges."⁷⁰ For these naval organizational initiatives to gain positive results, the United States has to retain its influence, support constructive and positive approaches, and most of all remain actively involved in Europe as the EU's ESDP and military organizations and capabilities adapt and evolve to meet the tasks at hand.

⁷⁰ NATO factsheet, "NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative", Available [Online]:

III. THE EXTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The post-Cold War international security environment has been marked with great uncertainty and dramatic changes throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. During the previous forty years, from 1949 to 1989, NATO operated in a historically limited area. The post-1989 developments have had a major impact on the way European political and security organizations have perceived their future security architecture and political requirements. Many of the military and political principles followed during the bipolar Cold War no longer apply in the ever-changing security and political environment of the multipolar post-Cold War period. Today's military planners and politicians cannot specifically define the future of warfare or the conflicts that security organizations will most likely face. Therefore, NATO and the European Union have to prepare for and respond to threats and risks by adapting their doctrine, forces, and decision-making arrangements.

Security throughout NATO's periphery in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Southwest Asia is now more dependent upon the diversity, ability, and interaction of naval forces. In contrast with Cold War preparations for clashes between huge land forces on the European continent, naval forces and their evolving command organizations and concepts (including STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF) give NATO and the EU the ability to meet any emerging security challenge. Naval forces are able to handle immediate crisis situations while maintaining the ability to reach out on a global scale. The diverse abilities of NATO naval forces can help to keep the threat of

non-Article 5 crisis situations from expanding into Article 5 situations. The ability of naval forces to handle an evolving situation may in some circumstances allow for land forces to be used much later and with less danger in crisis response contingencies or a stabilization process.

As President Clinton indicated in 1996:

Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow's NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence, and regional conflict.⁷¹

A. INSTABILITY, THE NEW ENEMY OF TODAY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The new enemy faced today and in the future, as described by Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, Commander-in-Chief of AFSOUTH in 1998, is the instability thrust into NATO's southern region.⁷² This post-Cold War instability and the broadening of NATO's responsibilities were most recently seen in the Kosovo conflict. These operations demonstrated that NATO and the WEU could work together to achieve a goal. Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 and Operation Allied Force in 1999 also showed that many warfighting capabilities need to be improved. New technologies and capabilities for future naval operations need to be developed within the European Union and in non-EU NATO European allies to successfully achieve battlespace dominance and interoperability with United States forces.

⁷¹ President William Clinton, "Address to City of Detroit on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," 22 October 1996. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/sp96.htm>.

⁷² Remarks by Admiral Lopez at the Assembly of the Western European Union Colloquy, Madrid, 6 May 1998. "A European Security and Defense Policy". Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/assembly>

Instability is nowhere more prevalent than in the southern and eastern regions of NATO's periphery. Conflicts are likely in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia, given their diverse cultures, economic problems, and engrained political antagonisms. These instabilities could affect the present and future security of Europe as well as the Atlantic Alliance.

Many of the primary factors that cause instability in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia stem from political and economic factors, including religious and political extremists, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, nationalism, and illegal immigration. The latter sometimes involves refugees flocking to neighboring countries in search of safety and a better life. Other factors that cross borders and affect numerous countries throughout these regions both economically and politically include strategic natural resources: water, oil, and gas. In order to deal with crises in troubled regions, NATO and the EU have to possess flexible naval forces that are capable of carrying out non-traditional roles as well as the traditional roles of projecting power ashore while maintaining political influence, protecting economic prosperity, and maintaining military superiority at all times. In short, today's naval forces have to be ready to be engaged across the full spectrum of changing and escalating conflicts: intrastate, interstate, and transstate.⁷³

As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said in 1996:

NATO's key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less likely. This is what we mean when we speak about building a new European security architecture: building a set of political relationships where each state feels secure and at ease.

⁷³ James O. Ellis Jr., "Traditional Naval Roles," in Richard H. Shultz and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., *The Role of Naval Forces in 21st-Century Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000), p. 141.

This—not the antagonism of the past—is the context in which NATO’s approach to the Mediterranean must be viewed. NATO must look to the South, as well as it must look to the East. NATO does not see the world in terms of cultural clashes. Rather, it focuses on avoiding instability—the threat which all of us have to guard against.⁷⁴

NATO is protecting the interests of its member nations in a volatile international security environment. The best way to protect these interests is to handle potential problems on the scene of the events or in very close proximity through forward engagement. It is much more difficult to react immediately to an evolving situation if forces are not present or prepared to act as quickly as possible. In many circumstances, the forces most suitable for immediate action in a crisis situation are naval forces. By being forward engaged, NATO and the EU are able to maintain defensive capabilities and to adapt to the changing security environment in any crisis situation or peacekeeping operation.⁷⁵

B. TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL THREAT

Terrorism is a constant and real threat to the United States and other countries around the world. No better example can be found to illustrate this threat to naval forces than the attack on the *USS Cole* (DDG-67) on October 12, 2000, in the port of Aden, Yemen, where seventeen United States sailors were killed.⁷⁶ Other recent examples of terrorism affecting United States citizens and interests abroad include the 1993 bombing of New York City’s World Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the

⁷⁴ Secretary General’s Speech at IEEI Conference Lisbon, November 25, 1996: “*NATO and the Development of the European Security and Defense Identity*.” Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu>

⁷⁵ Assembly of the Western European Union Colloquy Madrid, 6 May 1998. “A European Security and Defense Policy”. Available [Online]: <http://www.w eu.int/assembly/eng/seminars/980504/sitting4.htm>

⁷⁶ John F. Burns “The Warship Explosion: The Overview, Toll Rises to 17 in Ship Blast, as U.S. Hunts Suspects”, *New York Times*, 14 October 2000.

August 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. These terrorist attacks and other indiscriminate acts like the 1995 nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway show that terrorism is capable of directly or indirectly affecting United States citizens and/or interests.

1. The Changing Roles of Terrorism

During the last decade a quickly changing international security environment has made previously understood Cold War assumptions and strategies irrelevant and has brought new debates about today's ambiguous risks. The professional terrorist of the past was motivated by ideology or nationalism; operated according to a set of rules, including a specific political agenda and typical arms and bombs; and was sponsored by a state known to harbor terrorists.⁷⁷ Although such older terrorist organizations still exist, these older and more identifiable organizations are being joined by a variety of new organizations. According to the U.S. State Department's annual report on international terrorism for 1999, the number of terrorist incidents rose from 274 attacks in 1998 to 392 in 1999 and the number of persons killed fell from 741 to 233, while those wounded fell from 5,962 to 706.⁷⁸ While everyone would view the decreased number of deaths as positive, experts see the increase in the number of actual attacks as a warning sign for the future. The new terrorists that are organizing these numerous attacks are less structured, less traditional, and more characterized by a religious or quasi-religious mindset. According to Bruce Hoffman of the RAND Corporation,

⁷⁷ Bruce Hoffman. "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. *Countering The New Terrorism* (Washington, D.C., Rand 1999). p. 7.

⁷⁸ United States State Department, "Patters of Global Terrorism: 1999 The Year in Review", Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/review.html>.

The emergence of religion as a driving force behind the increasing lethality of international terrorism shatters some of our most basic assumptions about terrorists. In the past, most analysts tended to discount the possibility of mass killing involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism... Terrorists, we assured ourselves, wanted more people watching than dead... The compelling new motives of the religious terrorist, however, coupled with increased access to critical information and to key components of weapons of mass destruction, render conventional wisdom dangerously anachronistic.⁷⁹

During the Cold War, many terrorist groups were affiliated with Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations.⁸⁰ The rise of “modern” religious terrorist groups came about as a result of the 1979 Iranian revolution. New motivations for terrorist activities reside in political affiliations and desires to oppose Western influences in non-Western societies. Even though religious terrorist groups existed in the 1980s, they were state-sponsored and followed traditional patterns in trying to achieve distinct political objectives.

Terrorism was kept in check more often than not because of the antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War world was tumultuous but predictable. The fact that the Cold War was predictable created a relatively stable international context. As old ideologies and the predictability brought about by the Cold War have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that religion has become the popular motivation behind terrorist activities.⁸¹ With the Cold War at an end, ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East abound. This increase in violence and terrorist activity can

⁷⁹ Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy.” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RANDRev.winter98.9/methods>

⁸⁰ Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy.” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RANDRev.winter98.9/methods>

⁸¹ Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy.” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RANDRev.winter98.9/methods>

be partly traced to the increase in religious terrorist groups, paramilitary gangs, and local warlords.⁸² Since 1992 the largest and most organized terrorist groups have claimed religion as their driving force; and their numbers have grown from simply two groups to nearly twenty-six (nearly one half of the terrorist organizations identified by the State Department as of 1996).⁸³ According to the U. S. State Department, “One trend is the shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists.”⁸⁴

Terrorist group self-perceptions, primarily in Middle Eastern countries, have changed in that they now see themselves as the guarantors of their societies against Western corrupting principles—such as secularism and materialism. The “irregular warfare” conducted by the terrorist today has destroyed the distinct understanding of terrorism developed during the Cold War.⁸⁵ Today’s terrorism, led in many instances by religious organizations not aligned with states, is unpredictable and indiscriminate. Due to the lack of predictability and the indiscriminate nature of today’s religiously-motivated terrorist, violence may escalate in order to wreak havoc and undermine U.S.-led Western influence in the world political system. This chaos would be aimed at the United States in

⁸² John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. *Countering The New Terrorism* (Washington, D.C., Rand 1999). p. 42.

⁸³ Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy.” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RANDRev.winter98.9/methods>

⁸⁴ United States State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999”, Introduction. Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/intro.html>.

⁸⁵ John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. *Countering The New Terrorism* (Washington, D.C., Rand 1999). p. 44.

particular because terrorists see their only option in opposing United States conventional military power and world influence as through terror.

2. The Changing Face of Terrorism

The traditional motivations for terrorists primarily included ethnic rivalries, religious differences, and differing political affiliations. In the 1980s state-sponsored terrorism led by Libya and Iran was the means by which terrorists were funded, trained, and led. Today, terrorism motivated by religion is more intense and violent and in many cases responsible for more deaths than non-religious forms of terrorism. In 1995 only 25 percent of the recorded international terrorist incidents were carried out in the name of religion but these incidents accounted for 58 percent of the total deaths.⁸⁶ The higher proportion of deaths resulting from religious terrorist acts can be attributed to the “radically different value system, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and worldviews embraced by the religious terrorist.”⁸⁷

As Bruce Hoffman describes the intensity of religious terrorism,

violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are consequently undeterred by political, moral, or practical constraints... [R]eligious terrorists often seek to eliminate broadly defined categories of enemies and accordingly regard such large-scale violence not only as morally justified but as a necessary expedient to attain their goals.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy.” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RANDRev.winter98.9/methods>

⁸⁷ John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini. *Countering The New Terrorism* (Washington, D.C., Rand 1999). p. 49.

⁸⁸ Bruce Hoffman, “Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy.” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/RRR/RANDRev.winter98.9/methods>

The best examples of these types of terrorist organizations and acts are those influenced, trained, and led by the Saudi born millionaire Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden, now one of the FBI's ten most wanted, was formerly an American-backed Mujahadeen "holy warrior" fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s.⁸⁹ After the war in Afghanistan ended, Bin Laden emerged as the leader of "the base," a terrorist organization of battle-tested veterans of the Afghan war that consisted primarily of religious fundamentalists. Since the end of the Afghan war, Bin Laden has recruited many desperately poor people to join his ranks. These recruits have carried out terrorist activities since the end of the Gulf War against American military personnel.⁹⁰ His forces, based in Afghanistan, have ties to terrorists in as many as sixty other countries. Bin Laden has been linked to numerous terrorist activities, including the *USS Cole* attack. Bin Laden's belief system and hatred reportedly derive from his mistaken belief that the United States military presence in the Middle East amounts to "American occupation of Islamic countries."⁹¹ These non-state-sponsored terrorist organizations attempting to keep Western influence out of the Islamic world are the most threatening types of terrorists. The threat is significant because of their unpredictability and because of America's inability to pinpoint their location, or to coerce or directly influence these organizations.

An even more troublesome aspect of terrorism resides in the risk that terrorists will engage in acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—that is, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, questions about

⁸⁹ "FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives." Available [Online]: <http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten>

⁹⁰ David Eberhart and Hans H. Chen. "Web of Terror, Bin Laden's International Terror Network," Available [Online]: <http://www.apbonline.com/newscenter/majorcases/binladen/>

⁹¹ David Eberhart and Hans H. Chen. "Web of Terror, Bin Laden's International Terror Network,"

mismanagement in handling WMD have arisen with regard to Russia and the other former Soviet republics. The former Soviet Union has been judged a significant source of proliferation in WMD technology. This increases the options available to terrorist organizations and “rogue” countries.

There are many examples of how to deter and combat terrorism: Israel’s Operation Jonathan in Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976 rescued a hijacked airliner filled primarily with Israeli citizens.⁹² Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986 was a United States retaliatory strike against Libya for its involvement in the terrorist bombing attack on a West Berlin disco on April 5, 1985.⁹³ In August 1998, the United States retaliated to the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa by launching Tomahawk attacks against Osama bin Laden’s Afghanistan training camps. Retaliation is one method for combating terrorism, but inadequate as a deterrent factor. The most effective means to combat terrorism at home and abroad rely on national and international responses, including prevention and deterrence.

The United States follows four main policy tenets. “First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with

Available [Online]: <http://www.apbonline.com/newscenter/majorcases/binlande/>

⁹² Betser, Muki. “Operation Jonathan, the Israeli rescue operation at Entebbe.” Available [Online]: <http://specwarnet.net/miscinfo/entebbe.htm>

⁹³ “Libya: The U.S. Air and Sea Attacks on Libya in 1986.” Available [Online]: <http://home.earthlink.net/~dribrahim/march86e.htm>

the United States and require assistance.”⁹⁴ Non-military policy instruments include diplomacy and treaties limiting or prohibiting specific weapons of mass destruction. If these instruments fail to achieve the desired results, the employment of military forces may be necessary in some cases. Military forces on the scene manifest the resolve of the United States and its allies. Forward-deployed NATO naval forces can respond immediately while maintaining a defensive posture and protecting the Alliance as a whole.

C. MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES

The Mediterranean region is divided by religious, ethnic, economic, and political differences. As Western and Central Europe have become more stable in the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO and European leaders have focused attention on developments across the Mediterranean to resolve possible long-term problems.⁹⁵ These long-term problems in the Mediterranean region stem in part from what Samuel Huntington has defined as a clash of civilizations.⁹⁶ Future efforts by NATO and the European Union will therefore probably be concentrated in the southern and eastern periphery of the Mediterranean. NATO forces, especially naval forces, have to adapt to the changing security environment in this region. It is essential for NATO and the EU to prepare for all aspects of crisis response and peacekeeping operations, and to increase military cooperation among littoral countries so as to tailor specific forces to meet potential Mediterranean contingencies.

⁹⁴ United States State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999”, Introduction. Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/intro.html>.

⁹⁵ Ian Lesser, Jerrold Green, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Michele Zanini. “The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Steps,” Available [Online]: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/>

⁹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

NATO and the European Union have devoted some time and energy to cultivating relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics since 1991, but they have given far more time and attention to the Balkans. With NATO and EU involvement in Southeast Europe taking the center stage in the recent past, the importance of the Mediterranean region has slowly but surely increased for the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. The southern and eastern Mediterranean regions are particularly sensitive from a security viewpoint. Previously known as an “arc of conflict” and a hotbed of tension, the Mediterranean region is now characterized “more by political upheaval and socio-economic pressures, and by accompanying instability and tension.”⁹⁷

Many common strategic interests for the United States and its European allies are located along NATO’s southern and eastern flanks. The Mediterranean contains the busiest shipping lanes in the world and therefore constitutes a strategic economic interest. More than 3,000 ships pass through the Mediterranean daily, and during the Gulf War ninety percent of the war supplies were transported through the Mediterranean.⁹⁸ This confirms the Mediterranean as a strategic military interest. Several emerging security threats have surfaced and could have immediate and long-term effects on NATO and European security interests. The ongoing United States-British confrontation with Iraq and its expanding WMD capabilities directly affect the security environment in the Mediterranean. Economic problems and imbalances, the threat of terrorism, population expansion, and political violence among the countries of the region-plus southern

⁹⁷ Nicola de Santis, “The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative.” *NATO Review* No.1 Spring 1998. pp32-35. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm>.

⁹⁸ Stephen Larrabee and Carla Thorson, *Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). p11.

Europe's dependence on energy and natural resources supplied by North African and Persian Gulf countries--bring great cause for concern and potential conflict. All of these emerging and potential problems, including "socio-economic imbalances," can have a direct impact on "soft security problems and on the vital interests and well-being of the European member countries of NATO."⁹⁹

The North African population is expected to grow from approximately 63 million now to over 142 million by 2025. During the same period, the population in the southern NATO European member states is expected to grow by only 5 million. The disturbing aspect of this is that more than 30 percent of the Maghreb's population will be under 15 years old, and soon in need of employment—which promises to be scarce in the Maghreb.¹⁰⁰ Due to the economic and demographic imbalances of the North African region, mass migrations from North Africa to southern European NATO countries are expected to take place. The southern European NATO states may find it hard to absorb the sudden influx, which could cause political disturbances.

It is not known what could cause the next confrontation in the Mediterranean region, but the political, economic, religious, and social differences among the countries of the region (including southern European NATO countries) raise many questions as to how NATO and the EU will adapt to meet the evolving challenges.

⁹⁹ Nicola de Santis, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative." *NATO Review* No.1 Spring 1998. pp32-35. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm>

¹⁰⁰ Nicola de Santis, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative." *NATO Review* No.1 Spring 1998. pp32-35. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm>

With this in mind, NATO and the EU have dialogue initiatives in progress that address the growing security challenges in the Mediterranean.¹⁰¹ NATO's Mediterranean Initiative concentrates on information sharing and dialogue with six non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. It also provides a framework that promotes confidence building among NATO nations. The most important aspect is that it allows for practical cooperation among member nations as well as focusing greater attention on Mediterranean issues. As the process and initiatives continue to evolve, a longer-term vision has to be developed that "reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean."¹⁰² Cooperative development and dialogue are essential in promoting stability in the Mediterranean region.

D. ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN STRATEGY

The United States strategy for strengthening transatlantic security in the 21st century explains that, even though the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union dissolved, and former Warsaw Pact countries free, the bedrock underlying the European security architecture has not changed—NATO.¹⁰³ It also lays out the means by which America intends to achieve its security objectives: "enhancing security with present forces, bolstering economic interests abroad, promoting democracy globally, and protecting human rights and the rule of law."¹⁰⁴ With this in mind, the United States holds that it has

¹⁰¹ For background, see Richard Myrick, "The European Union's Barcelona Process and Mediterranean Security," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2000.

¹⁰² NATO Press Release, Conference on The Mediterranean Dialogue and the New NATO 24 February 1999. Available [Online]: http://www.isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/cristallina/ConvertDocCGI_cristallina.

¹⁰³ Jim Garamone. "DoD Re-emphasizes Importance of Europe to U.S. Strategy," Defense Press Service. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news>.

¹⁰⁴ Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st century. Department of Defense

permanent and vital national interests in preserving and protecting the NATO alliance.

According to a December 2000 report by the U.S. Department of Defense,

A fundamental tenet of U.S. strategy is that NATO will continue to be the anchor of American engagement in Europe...In particular, the goals of improving NATO's defense capabilities, strengthening the "European pillar" of the Alliance, and preparing for further enlargement of its membership are mutually supportive approaches to strengthening transatlantic security in the 21st century...To be an effective military alliance, NATO must fulfill certain key functions. Specifically, it must understand the likely threats to the security of its members, decide on the capabilities needed to address those threats, and develop and field those capabilities through a combination of national and Alliance-wide efforts.¹⁰⁵

The U.S. strategy also holds that transatlantic security is indivisible, and that this transatlantic security should involve the EU. The United States believes that the EU and NATO will again invite new members, and that this enlargement will be mutually beneficial.¹⁰⁶ The United States welcomes the efforts of the EU member nations to improve their collective defense and crisis response capabilities within the framework of NATO through ESDI. Through ESDI, the eleven EU countries in NATO can best pursue their development of new weapons and information systems within the framework of NATO's DCI. The American strategy for achieving these mutually supportive objectives calls for global leadership and shared cooperative security responsibilities. The United

release, December 2000. p. 13. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st century. Department of Defense release, December 2000. p. 13. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf>

¹⁰³ Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st century. Department of Defense release, December 2000. p. 10. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf>

States recognizes that it cannot, as Henry Kissinger stated, “remedy every wrong and stabilize every dislocation.”¹⁰⁷

NATO is the principal organization that helps shape the security environment within Europe and its periphery, including the Mediterranean. The United States believes that for it to continue to prosper and to serve as a world leader it has to preserve the international economy, free market enterprise, and world peace and stability. This requires continued U.S. engagement and influence in Europe with mutually supportive economic and security strategies. This policy reflects an interpretation of the history of U.S. engagement in European security affairs. The United States decided after World War II to learn from the mistakes it made after World War I. The United States would no longer isolate itself from Europe. Since 1949 United States involvement in European security affairs has been based on the North Atlantic Treaty.

Today’s security architecture is no longer primarily focused on countering the threat of direct invasion of NATO territory. NATO and the EU are focusing more on other types of threats, such as regional conflicts on the periphery of NATO (previously known as “out of area” operations), the proliferation of WMD, and terrorism, which could emanate from a variety of sources.¹⁰⁸ NATO and EU forces and structures must have a multifaceted strategy in opposing any threat to achieve success.¹⁰⁹ This strategy of adapting current military structures, organizations, and capabilities for the future is

¹⁰⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). p. 805.

¹⁰⁸ Shahram Chubin, Jeffold D. Green, and F. Stephen Larrabee. “NATO’s New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East,” RAND center for Middle East Public Policy Conference Proceedings July 15-16, 1999. Available [Online]: http://222.gcsp.ch/Engl/e_docs/organization/research/

¹⁰⁹ Jim Garamone. “DoD Re-emphasizes Importance of Europe to U.S. Strategy,” Defense Press Service. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news>

paramount in tackling new risks. NATO and the EU have to build security institutions that are mutually supportive to prevent future conflict, to deter aggression, to respond quickly and effectively to crisis situations, and to rebuild countries after hostilities have subsided.¹¹⁰ An overarching long-term strategy—including force structure and organizational adaptations--has to be implemented within the Atlantic Alliance. These adaptations are needed to protect the member countries against regional conflicts on the periphery of NATO.

The key elements of U.S. defense strategy worldwide are:

- To *shape* the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests.
- To *respond*, if necessary, to the full spectrum of crises, from deterring aggression or coercion and conducting smaller-scale contingency operations, to fighting and winning major theater wars.
- To *prepare* now for an uncertain future through focused modernization efforts, pursuing the revolution in military affairs, and hedging against unlikely but significant future threats.

In the Euro-Atlantic region, we pursue our *shape*, *respond*, and *prepare* strategy through three mutually reinforcing layers of engagement centered on NATO, multilateral engagement with countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and members of the EU, and bilateral engagement with individual Allies and Partners. Within each layer of engagement, U.S. military forces stationed in Europe play a key role in advancing our security objectives.¹¹¹

By following the key elements of U.S. future defense strategy--shape, respond, and prepare--the Atlantic Alliance and the EU can promote international peace and stability and protect their shared interests. These elements of United States defense strategy

¹¹⁰ Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st century. Department of Defense release, December 2000. p. 13. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf>

¹¹¹ Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st century. Department of Defense release, December 2000. p. 9. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf>

embodied by NATO may be enhanced if the EU becomes stronger and cooperates closely with NATO. A strengthened EU may enable NATO to become more politically balanced and militarily viable. If the EU becomes stronger, the European allies and partners will be able to do more within NATO operations and bear a greater share of the military burden.

Depending on its policies, a stronger and more capable European Union may be good for the transatlantic relationship. Increased capabilities could provide the EU and NATO more flexibility in choosing a response to specific situations.¹¹² A stronger European Union contributing to a stronger NATO is paramount to United States national interests; and for this reason, the United States continues to promote ESDI and DCI. Through ESDI and DCI the United States hopes to develop a closer working relationship with its European allies and partners while increasing its capabilities and flexibility to meet security challenges within the NATO framework.¹¹³

E. CAPABILITIES AND INITIATIVES

Improved European naval capabilities and the flexibility to meet emerging challenges have been pursued through the framework of ESDI within NATO and the ESDP concept within the EU. The United States is eager to share the burden of military operations with the EU as long as it remains committed to increasing its capabilities and pursuing policies consistent with NATO objectives. NATO military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo highlight the need for greater European capabilities in order for NATO European countries and the European Union to share more of the military burden with the United States. The naval organizations and concepts of STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED,

¹¹² NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. "Why NATO Supports a Stronger Europe," *Yearbook: The European Union 2001*. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/2000/a001205a.htm>.

¹¹³ NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. "Why NATO Supports a Stronger Europe," *Yearbook:*

EUROMARFOR, and EMMF are mechanisms by which NATO and/or EU interests could be protected in the evolving security environment within Europe and beyond.

NATO and the EU have evolved considerably since 1989. NATO's interventions in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts have made it clear that developments beyond NATO's borders could significantly affect the security interests of its members even in the absence of an Article 5 situation. The growing gap between the U.S. and the EU in terms of their capabilities to project power and carry out the full range of Alliance military missions and operations was first highlighted during the Bosnia conflict and later more widely recognized during the Kosovo conflict. The realization of the capabilities gap brought to the forefront Europe's need for different and more advanced weapons systems not geared toward the Cold War environment but suited for the new security environment. With the new security environment and reductions in the armed forces of most allies, NATO members realized the need for a transatlantic security relationship based on a fair and equitable sharing of responsibilities. American and European interests lie within and outside of Europe. With interests in the former Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, European security can be affected by situations in any of these regions. Alliance forces and capabilities have to be able to meet the emerging challenges, non-Article 5 and Article 5, which affect the interests of the Allies.

With ESDI initiatives and the DCI, Alliance members believe that the transatlantic link and NATO can be preserved and adapted to meet the emerging security challenges that NATO faces. To help in this process, NATO's maritime forces must continue to

work together in maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and incorporating technological advances into their warfare systems. However, NATO European military and naval capabilities are unlikely to be substantially improved in the near future despite the political rhetoric employed by some European leaders. In December 2000, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said that “NATO allies must pay more than lip service to the Defense Capabilities Initiative or the alliance stands in danger of becoming a relic.”¹¹⁴ Cohen also declared that the United States would remain committed to European security because “it is a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy that the United States cannot be secure and prosperous unless Europe is secure and prosperous.”¹¹⁵ According to Jim Garamone, Cohen further explained that

The United States would remain committed to the alliance and European security if the Europeans commit their resources to developing the capabilities outlined in the DCI... These include more sealift, more airlift and more precision-guided munitions. It also calls for developing a better command and control apparatus.¹¹⁶

Operations Deliberate Force in 1995 and Allied Force in 1999 revealed vast disparities in the military capabilities of European NATO members in relation to United States capabilities. These operations showed that significant advances need to be made in European military and naval capabilities, including sealift, airlift, and precision-guided munitions, in order for NATO to remain an effective means to deal with emerging challenges. NATO’s new security environment calls for forces to have the ability to meet

¹¹⁴ Cohen quoted in Jim Garamone, “Cohen Says Allies Must Invest or NATO Could Become Relic.” *American Forces Press Service*. 5 December 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news>

¹¹⁵ Jim Garamone. “Cohen Says Allies Must Invest or NATO Could Become Relic.” *American Forces Press Service*. 5 December 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news>

¹¹⁶ Cohen quoted in indirect discourse by Jim Garamone. “Cohen Says Allies Must Invest or NATO Could Become Relic.” *American Forces Press Service*. 5 December 2000. Available [Online]:

a broad range of challenges. Naval forces are excellent examples of forces that are versatile enough to meet these challenges.

During Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, naval forces carried out multiple missions, including air defense suppression, power projection, embargo enforcement, intelligence, reconnaissance, and no-fly-zone enforcement. Naval forces and their aggregate assets supported the land forces during both operations and continue to fulfill tasks associated with the peacekeeping operations under UN mandates. The capability gap problems that are dividing the United States from its European allies began during the early periods of the Cold War. “The Cold War scenario of a major NATO-Warsaw Pact war called for most NATO European military establishments to ‘fight in place’ rather than to project troops or firepower at great distances.”¹¹⁷ As European NATO members prepared to “fight in place,” American forces prepared for trans-oceanic power projection and reinforcement of the European Allies. For this reason, U.S. defensive strategy called for “improved fleets of large air-transport aircraft, air-to-air refueling tankers, carrier-battle groups, amphibious ships, and other mobility assets relevant to trans-oceanic power projection and expeditionary operations.”¹¹⁸ The previous decades of American preparation to project power ashore through extensive mobility assets and logistics support and the European Allies’ lack of a need for these assets became most explicitly manifest during and after Operation Allied Force. The defense-

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news>

¹¹⁷ David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 99.

¹¹⁸ David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 99.

capabilities gap between the United States and its European allies truly exists and does have implications for the future of the Alliance and European security.

The United States ability to plan and conduct sustained theater-wide operations (including power projection, long-range precision strikes, transport, reconnaissance, intelligence, and logistics) far surpasses that of any European country.¹¹⁹ Europe's deficiencies in numerous key areas have to be addressed for a more balanced coalition of NATO members to take part in future multinational military operations. To help ensure these deficiencies are addressed, the Venusberg Group recommended in June 2000 that the EU adopt as one of its goals the ability to "carry out a full Kosovo-type operation without recourse to U.S. assets" by 2015 and "a common defense by 2030."¹²⁰ At the April 1999 Washington Summit, the Allies announced the DCI in the following terms:

We have launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative to improve the defense capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). Defense capabilities will be increased through improvements in the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and information systems.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 99.

¹²⁰ *Enhancing the European Union as an International Security Actor: A Strategy for Action by the Venusberg Group* (Gutersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, June 2000), p. 5. Quoted in David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p. 101.

¹²¹ Secretary General Lord Robertson, speech at the 5th Forum Europe Defense Industries conference, Brussels, 23 May 2000. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000523a.htm>

F. CONCLUSIONS

The DCI and the other new initiatives discussed above are intended to enable the member states of NATO and the EU to work together more closely in both military and political terms. The naval elements within these initiatives embody key capabilities needed for the armed forces of the member nations of NATO and the EU to be effective in the future. Leadership from the United States is needed for NATO and its European members to continue to advance militarily—especially in the maritime dimension.

The development of naval capabilities in the EUOMARFOR organization and in the concept of EMMF reflect European aspirations to share a portion of the external security burden at times when a European force is deemed most appropriate. Responses to regional security challenges, however, should not be tied to rhetoric but to far-sighted planning and action. The post-Cold War NATO and EU decisions about responses to an unpredictable environment call for a multi-faceted approach involving a variety of participating allies and their forces. For many of the emergent challenges today, an appropriate way to respond would be through the versatility of more flexible, mobile, and diverse naval forces that are ready to operate with multinational forces on a local, regional, or global scale.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has shown that since 1989 the unpredictable and evolving security environment has been a key concern for the United States, NATO, and the European Union. The future security environment is difficult to forecast because it is beset with problems such as demographic imbalances, environmental and social change, and the tensions between prosperous and developing nations.¹²² The increasing interdependence and multiple interactions among nations throughout the world mean that few nations or political groups can be completely isolated from evolving crisis situations.

Future conflicts among nations are likely when they compete for economic advantage and access to limited natural resources. As three analysts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently concluded, “the free flow of commerce increasingly depends not only on free access to the world’s seas, but also to space and the electromagnetic spectrum.”¹²³ To be prepared for unpredictable threats and risks, the United States, NATO, and the EU have to realize that flexible military forces must be available to meet evolving security situations. The most adaptable forces capable of responding on short notice to the likely scenarios are maritime forces. For this reason, naval organizations such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and EUROMARFOR and the concept of an EMMF are among the forces that must be earmarked to meet emerging security threats.

¹²² Peter Abbott, “The Maritime Component of British and allied military strategy,” *Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies*, vol. 141, December 1996, p. 6.

¹²³ Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, “A Strategy for a Long Peace,” *Center*

A. ADVANTAGES AND IMPLICATIONS

STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF are naval mechanisms designed to meet the emerging security challenges, Article 5 or non-Article 5, within and beyond NATO and EU borders. NATO's new roles have called for United States and European allied naval components and organizations to perform combat and standing tasks of long duration before, during, and after Operation Deliberate Force in the Bosnia conflict (1995) and Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict (1999). These tasks have included intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; embargo enforcement; no-fly-zone enforcement; and reinforcement and preparedness for possible extraction of peacekeeping forces. In carrying out these operations and tasks, allied naval capability shortfalls have surfaced in the fields of interoperability, power projection, strategic lift, reconnaissance, and littoral-based operations. These capabilities need to be improved for future naval operations.

STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, EUROMARFOR, and EMMF are organizations and concepts intended to facilitate better resource sharing among the participating NATO and EU countries. The EU countries have expressed an interest in improving their ability to undertake some non-Article 5 missions (called "Petersberg Tasks" in the EU) directly related to the interests of the European Union with little help from the United States or without direct United States involvement in the future. These developments promote the construction of an ESDI within NATO while also helping to satisfy a United States desire to share the global security burden with European allies. As Javier Solana, then the NATO Secretary General, stated in his November 1996 speech in Lisbon,

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), January 2001, p. i.

We cannot predict all possible contingencies, and we should not tie ourselves to one organizational response. Sharing the European security burden with the United States means that we should not expect the US to lead every action or contribute significantly to every operation. There may be times when a European-led force would be appropriate... Another point that should be clear is that we do not want an Alliance within an Alliance. The ESDI is not a grouping, but a potential within NATO... It is clear that NATO will remain the ultimate guarantor of security. It can combine and coordinate the Allies' aim to strengthen stability throughout the continent. The more that Europeans can do this with the United States, the more successful we will be.¹²⁴

B. FURTHER ADAPTATIONS

Organizations such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and EUROMARFOR (and the EMMF concept) are necessary means of adaptation to new security requirements. They are designed to respond to Article 5 and non-Article 5 situations. As NATO and the EU expand their borders and influence, there is no shortage of potential conflicts or crisis situations that could occur within or beyond their borders. Tensions within Europe, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia create instability. United States and European values, prosperity, and influence are dependent on stability and economic progress in these regions. The citizens of the NATO and EU nations need to be confident that their military and political organizations are capable of delivering security. For the most part, today's security environment calls for multinational political-military actions instead of unilateral national actions. The need for multinational forces to oppose aggression derives from the fact that there is no real single immediate threat to Western interests as there was during the Cold War. The diversity of the challenges at hand has brought a greater need for collective security interventions rather than collective defense.

¹²⁴ NATO Secretary General Speech at the IEEI Conference in Lisbon, 25 November 1996. "NATO and the Development of the European Security and Defense Identity." Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961125a.htm>.

Although collective defense is the basis for NATO and should remain the ultimate function of the Atlantic Alliance, the unpredictable and diverse threats should be met with adaptable and flexible forces with capabilities diverse enough to meet any crisis situation.

STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and EUROMARFOR (and the EMMF concept) encompass key naval forces that have made adaptations in order to focus on and meet the new threats of the post-Cold War period since 1989. NATO and the EU have taken many initiatives to increase military capabilities and create forces ready to meet the emerging challenges of the future. Unfortunately, the EU's headline goal and NATO's DCI have primarily concentrated on land forces for peacekeeping operations and given little explicit attention to naval capabilities. This is regrettable because maritime forces with the general characteristics endorsed by NATO and the EU—sustainability, deployability, and effective engagement—are needed in order for the land components to be sustained, maneuvered, protected, and possibly extracted in an emergency. As well-informed analysts have pointed out, “With the advent of ad hoc coalitions, it cannot be assumed that prospective allies will provide base access. Evidence of this can already be seen in Greece’s refusal to provide bases during Operation Allied Force and the denial of base access for strike operations by Saudi Arabia and Turkey during Operation Desert Fox.”¹²⁵ Where no basing structures exist, naval forces such as STRIKFORSOUTH, CAFMED, and EUROMARFOR (and the EMMF concept) will play important roles in carrying out coalition or multinational operations in the littoral.

¹²⁵ Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, *A Strategy for a Long Peace*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), January 2001, p. 5.

With much of Europe, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia accessible by sea, NATO and the EU must define a maritime military posture ready for the emerging security environment. Naval forces with the ability to intervene immediately can influence foreign decision-makers and, if necessary, employ force or conduct other operations to satisfy their objectives. As the STRIKFORSOUTH campaign plan points out,

Maritime forces possess two primary attributes that make them well suited for the rapid response nature of the Alliance's security and military strategies: flexibility and self-sufficiency...Sea-based forces can rapidly marshal once nations transfer authority providing an expression of alliance resolve while allowing alliance consensus building to craft a more comprehensive strategy for crisis termination.¹²⁶

Naval organizations such as STRIKFORSOUTH, EUROMARFOR, and CAFMED can perform critical missions of power projection, presence, and sustainment while maintaining the capability to respond to a variety of evolving mission requirements.

C. CONCLUSIONS

United States influence in Europe is based on many factors, including America's economic strength, technological capacities, social cohesion, and cultural achievements. Washington's influence also reflects the reality that American capabilities in the field of satellite and remote observation, intelligence gathering, command, control, communications, transport, logistics, nuclear deterrence, power projection, and strike capabilities are unmatched by any European ally—or indeed any combination of European allies. The European Union will not be able to narrow the military capabilities gap with the United States and thereby diminish its dependence on the United States without

¹²⁶ "Campaign Plan: Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe," 1 December 1999, p. 11.

substantial effort and cost. The EU countries seem unwilling to spend those resources and will have to balance the transatlantic relationship by political and economic means. NATO remains as relevant today as it has ever been because its members work together to bring their combined energy to bear in shaping the European security environment. “NATO’s key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less likely.”¹²⁷ For example, during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia NATO created security arrangements with non-NATO countries to contain the conflict and prevent a wider war.

NATO’s new command structures, concepts such as EMMF, and organizations such as EUROMARFOR, STRIKFORSOUTH, and CAFMED are among the developments that will answer the future operational questions for NATO’s multinational operations, including Article 5 and non-Article 5 challenges. These naval organizational and conceptual adaptations, including those made within the framework of ESDI, are intended to strengthen NATO and the EU and to enhance their ability to act within the immediate European area and beyond. These naval organizations and concepts must continue to develop mutually supportive and complementary capabilities while adapting to the changing international security environment in order to sustain the West’s naval superiority.

¹²⁷ NATO Secretary General Speech IEEI Conference in Lisbon, 25 November 1996. “NATO and the Development of the European Security and Defense Identity.” Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu>.

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